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The Chameleons of Rojava


The recent exploitation of the collapse of the rebel front line in Aleppo by the PYD’s armed wing (YPG) and its allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces took some observers by surprise.

Having been praised by many (including Syrian revolution supporters) for determined resistance to the Da’esh juggernaut, the YPG became a pariah almost overnight for attacking every rebel group in Aleppo in its bid to grab as much territory as possible before the regime got there first.

In 2014 there had been something of a thaw in relations between the YPG and various rebel groups after years of fighting that had raged ever since the YPG took control of Syria’s northern Kurdish regions. The threat of Da’esh bearing down upon them brought several groups together in an uneasy truce against a common enemy. The crucible was Kobane, which almost fell to Da’esh in September 2014 before FSA and YPG units drove the group back with heavy casualties on both sides (and more than a little help from US airstrikes). The Euphrates Volcano was the most prominent of the joint operations rooms.

Yet over a year later attempts at unity have fallen apart once again as the YPG assaults the rebels in Aleppo via the Efrin canton, accusing anyone and everyone who stands in their way of being “Islamist” aggressors. Indignation was expressed by observers online and offline, Syrian and non-Syrian. But given the YPG’s recent history, this move was hardly unexpected.

The YPG (“People’s Defence Units”) established in 2011 originated in the PYD (Democratic Union Party) established in 2003, the Syrian wing of the Kurdish Marxist rebel group PKK. The PKK has been engaged in a decades-long struggle against the Turkish state. The Assad regime had massacred tens of revolting Kurds in al-Qamishli in 2004, displacing thousands. The PYD was seen as an opponent of the regime in the aftermath of the massacre.

Up until April of 2011 when the anti-regime uprising was in full swing, the PYD was said to be engaged in a very lop-sided struggle against the regime. Up to 1400 YPG-linked activists were arrested, tortured and killed. The leadership (including current PYD leader Salih Muslim) was exiled abroad, unable to enter Syria for fear of arrest.

When the uprising began in March 2011 the PKK was initially supportive of the anti-government rising. Anti-Assad activists were interviewed on the PKK’s RojTV, given over to Syrian opposition use. Known opposition figures such as Abdulrazak Eid, Haytham Manna, Fayez Sara, Hassan Abdul Azim and Yassin al-Haj Saleh were interviewed. The PKK also encouraged Syrians to rise up and stage demonstrations.

That same March, Iran’s army began heavily shelling the PKK’s bases in the Qandil Mountains. The Qandil Mountains are a crucial stronghold; from this natural fortress the various PKK-aligned groups receive orders from the central command. Several branches of the PKK are garrisoned there alongside the PYD. This includes the Iraq-based Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PCDK) formed in 2002, and the Iran-based Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) formed in 2004.

After the shelling increased, jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan got the message. He ordered the pro-revolution discourse to cease from his Imrali Island prison. The tables turned; PKK propaganda outlets now smeared the revolution – for everything from demonstrations being carried out outside mosques (the PKK is avowedly atheist) to the revolution allegedly being “controlled” by the Muslim Brotherhood.

On April 6th 2011 Ocalan told his lawyer to transmit a message to the regime. The following was part of it; Ocalan declared that Assad should “meet with the Kurdish organizations. The PYD is there, and if Assad’s Syria carries out democratic reforms we will support them.” In exchange for supporting the regime Ocalan suggested several steps:

 Cultural and self-administration rights could be recognized as part of these reforms; for example, municipalities could be run [independently]. Kurds could be given the chance to administer their affairs for themselves and have their identity recognized. If they [the Syrian regime] do that, we will support them […]

He finished off his statement with a  nonchalant remark: “The Assad family knows my approach to the cause.”

This is hardly an exaggeration. From 1979-1999, the PKK was welcomed by Hafez al-Assad. Syria’s late ruler helped the PKK to establish training camps and Ocalan gave him permission to use PKK fighters for operations in his proxy war against Turkey. The PKK also held official conferences (at least two by 1982) on Syria’s territory. Ocalan also received weapons and financial support from the regime. His organisation was essentially controlled by Syrian intelligence; Ocalan was too indebted to Hafez to resist.

When the PKK declared war against Turkey in 1984, Hafez allowed Ocalan to recruit thousands of young Syrian Kurds for the bloody struggle. By the 1990’s Ocalan was so obliged to the Assad family that he denied Syrian Kurds (or Kurdistan in Syria) existed; he claimed most were “immigrants.” As such, the PKK would “return them to their original homeland.”

Such was Ocalan’s dependency on Hafez al-Assad’s clique for support that he was even prepared to deny that the existence of the Kurdish people in Syria had any historical basis. His statements never came close to criticising Assad’s tyrannical mistreatment of his own Kurdish population – in fact he encouraged Assad’s “Arabization” (expelling Kurds from Syrian Kurdistan and supplanting them with Arabs) by claiming they should never have been there in the first place.

By 1999 Turkey had tired of the PKK launching assaults against their state from Syria; Hafez was told to either give up Ocalan or face war. In 1998 Syria expelled Ocalan (he was then arrested and deported to Turkey in 1999) and went about normalising relations with Turkey. When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000 he closed the PKK’s camps, renditioned key PKK members to Turkey and dismantled their infrastructure. However, some claimed that clandestine Syrian support for the PKK continued, and that the PYD may have been collaborating with the regime, even engaging in subversive activity against the Kurdish population on behalf of the regime.

By April 2011, Ocalan and the PKK had seen the opportunity to re-establish their organisation within Syria – on the side of the Assad regime. On April 13th 2011 Ocalan released another statement to his lawyer, reiterating his previous demands and adding:

If Syria accepts these demands, support will be given to Assad […] If the state moves in the opposite [direction], takes temporary steps and adopts a dilatory political approach, the Kurdish people, led by the PYD, will fight alongside the Arab opposition, following the principle of democratic self-administration.”

In other words, the PKK would side with whoever was guaranteed to grant it the breathing space it needed within Syria’s borders to take advantage of the collapsing regime and establish a Kurdish “state” based on Ocalan’s blend of hard-line socialism and “Democratic Confederalism”.

Assad took the bait. In April 2011 Ocalan sent 1000 PKK fighters from the Qandil Mountains into Syria in coordination with the regime’s security apparatus. They began to organise themselves into the “People’s Defence Units” (YPG), completely unmolested by the omnipresent regime forces. By late 2011 Assad had allowed the PYD to open six Kurdish language schools in territories under his control. These schools are openly used for propaganda and indoctrination purposes. In March 2012 another 2000 PKK fighters were allowed to enter Syria’s borders.

In July 2012 the regime put a plan of action into effect in coordination with the PYD and withdrew its forces from Kobanî, Amuda, and Afrin. In fact the regime abandoned most of Syrian Kurdistan, save Qamishli and al-Hasakah province. The PYD’s YPG units then systematically took control of the towns the government forces handed to them (with barely a shot being fired), claiming they “liberated” the territories from Assad’s grip.

Consequently anti-regime demonstrations that had previously raged in the Kurdish territories were repressed by the PYD. Anti-Assad graffiti was painted over, Syrian Air Force Intelligence (secret police) headquarters and forces in PYD territory were allowed to continue operations, and anti-Assad activists were assassinated by the YPG. Kurdish opponents of the PYD are subject to arbitrary arrest (which has continued to this day) and media outlets the PYD deems too critical are shut down. This month the PYD banned the Kurdish Rudaw network from Kobane. Yet portraits of Assad still sit proudly alongside portraits of Ocalan, as do YPG checkpoints alongside the checkpoints of the regime.

Kurds in Amuda protested against the YPG in 2013. The demonstration was fired upon and resulted in 7 fatalities and 40 injuries. The PYD/YPG became known as the “shabiha of the Kurds” for repressing demonstrations on Assad’s behalf. A 107-page report entitled, “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-Run Enclaves of Syria,” was released by Human Rights Watch in 2014. The report documented arrests (including abuse in captivity), killings and use of child soldiers.

Popular Kurdish opposition leader Mashaal Tammo had already been assassinated in suspicious circumstances in October 2011 as he organised an anti-regime coalition. Now others began to fall; tribal leader Abdullah Bedro was also shot and killed. The PYD denied any involvement, eventually admitting complicity when the body of a fallen YPG fighter was discovered at the scene. The PYD also seems to have killed Dr. Serzad Hac Resid, the Aleppo-based representative of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYDKS). He had been involved in distributing video footage exposing the Assad regime’s brutality.

In 2013 YPG leader Salih Muslim (whose first act upon returning to Syria in 2011 was to  meet with Bashar al-Assad as part of the “patriotic opposition”) was claiming the anti-Assad opposition forces were responsible for the 2013 chemical massacre in Ghouta, regurgitating pro-regime propaganda by essentially claiming rebel fighters gassed themselves and their families to induce foreign intervention. Muslim also claimed the collapse of the regime would “be a disaster” for Syrians. Muslim’s statements have often been overlooked by the media at large; in November 2011 he stated that PKK summary executions of Kurds deemed to be “traitors” were justifiable. “If the PKK punished people, it had its reasons”, Muslim remarked.

FSA men killed near Azaz
Free Syrian Army members killed in clashes with the YPG were displayed on YPG propaganda channels.

When Muslim was asked if his men would eventually join forces with the Syrian army, he was open to the idea. “Why not join forces if the Syrian forces are trying to return to the region in a different perspective and under new conditions? In that case the PYD will become a part of the Syrian army.”

When Assad’s advisor Bouthaina Shabaan boasted that the YPG was an integral part of the regime army the YPG strongly denied it – only for UN Ambassador Bashar al-Jaafari to back her up. “These Syrian Kurds supported by the American administration are also supported by the Syrian government – just for your information,” Jaafari said.

Shabaan and Jaafari aren’t the only ones to speak up in support of the PKK. Assad himself claims to have supplied them with many of the weapons they later used against his enemies. Architect of the Baniyas massacre Mihraç Ural claims the YPG hasn’t clashed with the regime and should be seen as “necessary“. Ural was responsible for introducing Abdullah Ocalan to Hafez al-Assad decades earlier.

Mihrac Ural and Abdullah Ocalan together in Syria during the Cold War.

It later emerged that Iranian forces had arrested PKK leader Murat Karayilan in 2011 after a tip-off from Turkish intelligence. After initially planning to rendition him to Turkey, Iran brokered a deal with Ocalan. They would free Karayilan in exchange for a ceasefire and the PJAK withdrawing from Iran. Iran also wanted the PKK’s central command to order the PYD to support the Assad regime to take some pressure off Assad. The request was granted; Karayilan was released and PJAK units withdrew from Iran to Turkey.

By 2012 the PYD and its YPG military wing as avoiding confrontation with the regime at all costs. Instead they turned their attention to the anti-regime opposition. In July 2013 the YPG seized Ras al-Ayn and its border crossing from anti-government forces. Two days later they stormed Tal A’lo. By September the YPG was even clashing with the FSA and shelling the refugee-populated town of Atme. By November the YPG had grabbed 40 more villages, including Aleppo province’s strategic Tell Tamer, and was actively clashing with Da’esh fighters (Da’esh also fight the anti-regime opposition) throughout the region.

By early-2014, cooperation between the FSA and various YPG groups began, as Da’esh presented a growing menace.  The Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, Liwa Ahrar Souriya (Brigade of Syrian Free Men) and the Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa (Brigade of Raqqa Revolutionaries) joined the YPG in fighting Da’esh.

By September 2014 the YPG had been pushed back to the tiny border town of Kobane by Da’esh. By then, the Obama administration had seen fit to make the YPG the sole benefactor of US arms and support. Backed by an immense volume of US airstrikes (and smaller FSA formations) the YPG managed to break the siege, recapture all the lost territory and launch an offensive that eventually unified the two YPG-controlled “cantons” in Syria with the fall of the border town of Tall Abyad in July 2015. Every battle fought by the YPG since Kobane has been heavily aided by US airstrikes.

What followed was less than positive. The YPG initially let the FSA formations put the green revolutionary flag up for the cameras before taking it down and replacing it with their yellow standard. Local FSA commander Abu Ali said the move violated an agreement between the two sides that both flags would fly. Merely a day after the fall of the city, his men left to rejoin their comrades in the north.

“We sacrificed so many martyrs for this flag,” he said. “Would you accept your flag being insulted in this way?” He wearily admitted that some FSA-affiliated groups would remain fighting with the YPG however, claiming the support (and weapons) they receive makes them dependent on them.

But this is hardly the most serious allegation; far more serious are the multiple witness accounts and reports by human rights groups claiming the YPG forcibly displaced thousands of Arabs and Turkmen from Tel Abyad and the surrounding regions. Methods of displacement included threats and burning down houses of non-Kurds, even though Tel Abyad and the surrounding towns aren’t historic Kurdish territory.

Local civilians claim the YPG forced them to leave Tel Abyad, some 16,000 were displaced as the YPG advanced with heavy US air cover. In an unusual display of unity, more than a dozen anti-Assad opposition groups (from Islamic factions to secularists) signed a statement condemning the group.

One refugee claimed the group told local Arabs their territory was part of “Rojava” and they should go back to the Tadmur desert where they “belong.”  Ibrahim al-Khider, a powerful local tribesman, was told that he and his people should “Go back to your desert.”

Spokesman for the Syria’s Turkmen minority Tarik Sulo also complained bitterly of his people facing displacement. Although the YPG is traditionally perceived as having a cordial relationship with Syria’s minorities, the Assyrian Khabour Guards nullified their alliance with the YPG. In a statement they claimed the group turned on them, killing their commander and trying to drive them out of their villages. One Amnesty report claimed the Arab-populated village of Husseiniya had seen more than 90% of its buildings demolished by the YPG to ensure that residents couldn’t return.

Although the YPG strongly denies these claims, their conduct in Tal Abyad seems rooted in long-standing YPG policy toward Arabs. In 2013 YPG leader Salih Muslim said that Arabs in lands they deemed to be Kurdish “will have to be expelled” because “all the villages” there belong to the Kurds. The reference to all the villages can now be understood in the aftermath of the takeover of villages with little to no Kurd inhabitants.

Some foreign fighters embedded with the YPG have also expressed reservations. A German volunteer described the YPG as sending untrained minors into battle with little training as if it were “a school trip with guns.” Adding that he couldn’t confirm systematic displacement, he admitted “they’ll trash the place” if it’s an Arab settlement.

Weapons from Germany.png
Western reluctance to arm anti-Assad forces in case weapons fall into the “wrong hands” hasn’t applied in the case of the YPG, which has repeatedly given US arms to its counterpart in Turkey. This has included German anti-tank missiles and drones.

The YPG continued advancing, unifying several FSA groups in the “Syrian Democratic Forces” in October 2015. The groups included Jabhat al-Akrad (Kurdish Front) the FSA’s 99th Brigade and Special Operations Center 455. It also included Jayth al-Thuwar (Army of Revolutionaries) composed of former members of the now-defunct Syria Revolutionaries Front. Despite friction with the anti-Assad resistance the YPG was often given the benefit of the doubt (and some SDF members, including JaT, were based in opposition territory) until February of this year during the regime assault on Aleppo.

On February 1st the Syrian Army’s 4th Mechanized Division, Hezbollah, Kata’ib Hezbollah (Iraqi Hezbollah) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (an Iraq Shi’ite militia),attacked positions of the anti-Assad forces around Bakshoy, heading to the besieged Shi’a enclaves of Nubol and al-Zahraa. By February 3rd they overran opposition defences and relieved the two towns.

The assault cut opposition forces off from their Turkish supply line which had enabled them to get supplies into Aleppo and withstand the regime siege. However this could have been reversed or blunted (as the earlier Aleppo offensive had been) had it not been for the YPG and its SDF umbrella assaulting rebel positions 24 hours later on February 4th, grabbing the northern towns of Ziyara and Khreiybeh north of Nubl in coordination with the regime. The regime simultaneously attacked and captured Mayer and Kafr Naya.

Previously the YPG had taken towns in raids. However this was a prolonged assault on rebel-held Aleppo in coordination with the regime and allied forces. On February 6th the YPG and Jaysh al-Thuwar took two villages, al-Faisal mill and a hill as the regime advanced. They also coordinated with the Russian Air Force which bombed the town of Menagh for them. The YPG warned rebels to hand over the town or they would get the Russians to bomb them again (it’s worth noting that the YPG allegedly threatened Arab residents of villages surrounding Tal Abyad with US airstrikes in 2015).

On February 7th the regime’s forces were some 7km from opposition-held Tell Rifaat. At the same time the YPG & aligned forces took three villages and then (by the regime’s own admission) set up a joint checkpoint with the regime forces to coordinate their assault on the opposition.

The SDF has expressed no reservations on ignoring the regime, claiming they’re not a “a problem.” It may be surprising to some as various SDF’s factions claim to be FSA. However some groups (Jabhat al-Akrad and Jaysh al-Thuwar) are controversial; al-Akrad was expelled from the FSA for being too close to the PKK. Jaysh al-Thuwar members are former fighters for Jamal Maarouf. His SRF was expelled from Idlib and Aleppo for looting and extortion, practices which SDF members have continued throughout Aleppo province. Even their US allies refused lethal aid to the SRF in its early days, reluctant to be seen to be seen as close to them.

In fact SDF commander Abu Ali bard claims the SDF is far from an anti-regime force as they “protect” Kurds alongside the regime (no mention of Arabs, despite the coalition allegedly having an inclusive focus) and “received weapons from them and fought against the organization (Da’esh) together.” Another nail in the coffin of the YPG’s denials.

A gathering of regime and PYD/YPG loyalists in Hasakah province. The Hezbollah flag should also be noted; Hezbollah backed up the YPG by sending 100 fighters to assist in operations.

On February 10th Mennagh was hit with over 30 Russian airstrikes and finally fell to the YPG/SDF. On February 11th they began an assault on rebel-held ‘Azaz (as boasted about by pro-regime Al-Masdar News) the most strategic anti-regime town in the province. On February 13th the SDF continued trying to take ‘Azaz, coming within 500 metres of the town. This prompted Turkish artillery to open fire on the SDF from across the border.

Prime Minister Davutoglu demanded that the SDF withdraw. The SDF refused, parading captured anti-Assad fighters on their TV networks as “al-Nusra.” On February 16th the SDF attacked the Castello road (the opposition’s crucial supply route) in an attempt to besiege the city. The attack was repelled.

The SDF then started taking opposition strong-points in the city with the backing of Russian strikes (as reported by pro-regime media). On February 26th the regime launched an assault on rebel groups through PYD-held territory. On February 27th regime forces handed over the village of Ahras to the SDF. Fighting continues around the city and its rural areas. The YPG has been accused of looting Arab towns and committing atrocities. Many Arabs fled into Da’esh-controlled territory in fear.

The Future of the PYD in Syria

Turkey has long viewed the YPG with suspicion, seeing it as synonymous with the PKK. As did the US Counter-Terrorism Centre until 2014 (the link was abruptly removed and the text altered). US association with the YPG has done more to put Syrians off the group and its allies than anything else. As one analyst put it:

The U.S.’s support for the PYD is sustained by a legal fiction—that the PYD is a separate entity from the PKK. It is not: the PYD is subordinate to the PKK command structure. As one fighter put it, “Sometimes I’m a PKK, sometimes I’m a PJAK [the Iranian branch of the PKK], sometimes I’m a YPG. It doesn’t really matter. They are all members of the PKK.” Understandable, then, that the U.S. arming the PYD upsets Turkey. But the PYD’s history means that the U.S. supporting it upsets many Syrians.

When heavy Russian bombardment of opposition forces began in September 2015 (under the guise of fighting Da’esh) the PYD immediately made themselves available to the Russians, claiming they would be willing to become partners in exchange for arms and air support. The YPG had made the same offer to the US-led coalition only a month earlier, inviting them to establish bases (the US has since established an airfield in PYD-controlled territory).

The PYD’s claim of being an ally of the FSA as it coordinates action with the US coalition and the Russian forces did nothing to make the group welcome in the eyes of the majority of Syrians. The US is widely seen as (and, in fact, is) supportive of Assad and Iranian influence in Syria, a viewpoint which unfortunately stands up to the facts (and was hardly dispelled by Kerry’s threats directed at the  opposition).

The PYD cannot be both anti-regime and pro-regime, anti-intervention and pro-intervention. In fact the PYD/YPG is often referred to as “the Kurds” collectively, as if Syria’s Kurds support the group as a whole. This misconception is clouding our ability to interpret events on the ground. Kurds are overwhelmingly anti-regime, rebel groups are full of Kurds (up to 15% of the FSA is Kurdish) and the “Syrian opposition” (AKA foreign hireling) blocs are full of Kurdish groups. The one-time leader of the Syrian National Council was Kurdish politician Abdulbaset Sieda. Even the Da’esh attack on Kobane was led by a Kurd, and Da’esh loathes Syrian opposition forces and the PYD alike.

Since 2011 the PYD has been firmly on the side of the Assad regime. For now this is a tenable position. The opposition are too distracted by the Assad regime, Russian bombing and Da’esh onslaughts to act decisively against them, to say nothing of the fact that they enjoy the protection of the US coalition. Although Turkey is shelling their fighters and has intervened against them on the ground, it is curtailed from moving against them decisively. US special forces are intermingled with the very units Turkish armed forces are (timidly) attacking. Obliterating several US commandos would create a backlash that Erdoğan certainly doesn’t need.

It is true that the YPG has sometimes clashed with the Assad regime as many PYD supporters often claim. However these clashes have been limited, local skirmishes which are often ignited by disputes between YPG and regime commanders over control of territory or attempts to forcibly conscript Kurds into the regime army. There have been no permanent disputes or serious grievances between the two.

Should the balance of power tip in favour of the anti-Assad fighters, or should the regime fall, the PYD could quickly find its position untenable. Widely detested by Syrian opposition groups from Islamic fighters to secular forces, the YPG could easily be set upon by these groups. Such was the case in 2012 and 2013 when the FSA, Ahrar al-Sham and al-Nusra rallied against them. Only next time the YPG may not be able to count on the regime to draw opposition fighters away from their fragile hold on Syria’s Kurdish regions.



  1. are you by chance paid for by the Turkish regime ? in the pocket of the Turkish Regime, affiliated to members of the so called oppositions living in luxury hotels in Turkey paid for by Turkish fascist islamist state? what a load of rubbish. historically areas which had been kurdish and then arabised by Assad does not make them land of arabs or turkomans. then really need to distinguish between facts and fiction.

    Liked by 2 people

    1. Isn’t that just typical? You assume that nobody can be critical of the PKK or any of its affiliates without somehow being in the pockets of their enemies. What sort of knee-jerk logic is that? That being said, you’ve clearly added in all sorts of jingoisms about “Islamist” bogeymen, so it’s apparent to me that you didn’t really read this at all. You just looked over it and reacted in impotent rage.


      1. Yes but your language makes it clear throughout that your only purpose is to smear Kurdish people. Okay you made a film on Syria, but how about revealing your funding, and qualifications for rewriting history on the basis of selected news items. After all it seems clear that Erdogan’s regime could be paying out millions to write similar articles. Also the only ”analyst” you quote, Kyle Orton, is a zoologist!

        Liked by 1 person

      2. Mike, I know people who are part-Kurdish. I’m a Muslim; there’s no racism in Islam. If you’re a Muslim and you think people are racially superior then you need to sort your life out. In regard to my funding, I take no funding from anyone. The most I get in terms of funding is having been paid for a single news article in February of 2016.

        If you read my recent pieces, you would know that I’m not at all friendly to Erdogan either. Erdogan is a hypocrite who murders Muslims and allies with imperialist powers like the US and Russia while feigning Islamic credentials. I recommend you read “Syria’s Enemies Are No Longer Hidden”, in which I implicate Erdogan in deliberately helping to compromise Aleppo’s defences in order to let the city starve.

        I disagree with Kyle on many issues, but in some cases he is correct.


  2. This is a pretty inaccurately slanted view of the sdf. Their conflicts with fsa have been pretty limited as well, and many of the fsa that they have been in conflict with are responsible for that conflict. And yes, the fsa is made up largely of islamists at this point.

    SDF are the only group whose primary conflict is with isis. Maybe you think them prioritizing isis means they are pro-regime, then in that case the FSA prioritizing the regime means they are pro-isis right?


    1. With respect, I wouldn’t call the conflicts with the FSA “limited”. They helped Assad to besiege and starve Aleppo. The FSA didn’t start any of that, the YPG attacked them alongside the regime.

      Plus, there’s nothing wrong with “Islamists” unless you’re referring to extremists like Da’esh. Being a normal Muslim who wants your country to be run on Islamic principles is NOT a bad thing. The FSA, Islamic Front, Ahrar al-Sham and others have fought Assad AND Da’esh, but focused on Assad. Why? Because he’s committing a genocide. I don’t call the SDF pro-regime because they don’t focus on Assad, I call them pro-regime because they work with him to undermine the resistance to his regime.


  3. I have closely followed the Turkey-PKK conflict in Turkey over the years. Unfortunately, many claims in this article are not reflecting the truth in anyway. You have used many sources that are biased and unreliable. The point of view you have used is also one-sided.

    Do you have any proofs that Öcalan has written such letters?
    You claim that PKK would have established a Kurdish “state” based on “Democratic Confederalism” can’t be true. The problem is that you can’t establish a state on such system. As it is described: Democratic Confederalism is the democratic system of a people without a state. I have followed the Turkey-PKK conflict very closely and I’ve never seen PKK leaders or members saying they want a “state”.

    Your claim that Öcalan sent 1000 PKK fighters isn’t really true. At least, not in those times. Also, the YPG was already established in 2004 during Qamishli riots. There is a documentary about it. It was active between 2004 and 2011.

    Your claim that the regime directly “handed” those areas to the YPG is also false. The regime withdrew its forces from many areas and in some areas, it wasn’t even YPG which filled the gap.

    There have been many stories where are told that the YPG had assassinated anti-Assad activists but unfortunately all claims have been so far proved to be false. Also, if YPG had such agreements with Assad, can you tell me why YPG handed surrendered Assad soldiers (more than 40), including Syrian commander and Colonel Naji Abu Shaar of the Syrian army’s 17th Division to the opposition? All those soldiers were later executed by the opposition. This incident itself proves that claim that there was an alliance between Assad and YPG is false.

    Did you forget to mention the massacres the opposition carried out around Tel Abyad, Tell Hassel and Tell Aren incidents in 2013 or did you just decide to not mention them, so your entire story could look better? That’s when the YPG exactly started to see the opposition as a threat. Your Amuda demonstration is related to the Kurdish NC supporters who were part of the opposition. It has nothing to do with anti-Assad demonstrations.

    Mashaal Tammo was assassinated by the government. This is what his son said and also many other sources said later. It has nothing to do with the YPG or PYD.

    Abdullah Bedro was openly supportive of Turkey. He publicly talked about his relations with the AKP government in Turkey. His case has nothing to do with Assad. It’s still unclear who killed them but some YPG members are suspected.

    Dr. Serzad Hac Resid. Who is this guy?

    Saleh was right about chemical weapons. The opposition used chemical weapons against the Aleppo Kurds and even admitted it by releasing a statement..

    The opposition openly and publicly shelled the Sheiq Maqsud hundreds of times, used chemical weapons and carried out attacks every week. What do you expect from the YPG? They had no choice than stay away from the regime offensive.

    Your Karayilan story is epic, I don’t know how much search you did and how much you know about sources you have used but I wouldn’t trust them so much, especially Yeni Safak. This newspaper is famous from its sci-fi-style political news and conspiracy theories. This same newspaper has tens of times claimed that the PKK has been destroyed, Karayilan and Bahoz Erdal have been killed.

    I have to admit that I enjoyed so much while reading your post, great work! In my opinion, it’s a masterpiece of cherry picking and conspiracy theories.

    Liked by 1 person

    1. First of all, thank you for reading this. I appreciate the feedback. However, I have some responses.

      1) Just because the sources are supposedly biased (and no source is impartial) doesn’t negate the quality of the information, especially in regard to translations of statements of Saleh Muslim himself and others. Like it or not, said information exists.

      2) NOW Lebanon has written about Ocalan’s letters and I’ve provided a link for you to view.

      3) How can “democratic confederalism” have any basis in reality in PYD-controlled Syria when Rojava is run from the top-down? Kurdish opposition politicians are arrested, dissidents jailed, protests banned (and some say the PYD are stricter than the regime in clamping down on demonstrations) etc. Any facade of such an ideology is negated by the reality on the ground.

      4) Yes, the YPG was established. But it really kicked off in the form it is today in 2011 and 2012, when Bashar allowed the PYD into Syrian territories. Do you really think that thousands of PYD fighters materialised out of nowhere (many of them Iranian & Turkish Kurds) in Syria just like that? There’s no way for them to enter the country without being attacked by the regime if they don’t have prior approval.

      5) The regime pulled back from those areas and barely fired a shot, yet fought tooth and nail for Idlib, Aleppo and others. Also, the YPG handing soldiers to the opposition is meaningless, because the PYD helps and fights everyone depending on expediency. It tussles with Assad in Hasakah, yet works with his army. It won’t let the regime enter Sheikh Maqsoud, yet worked with it to besiege Aleppo. The PYD will do anything and everything to keep its power. Including offering its services to both the Americans *and* the Russkies.

      6) Can you genuinely disprove any of these assassinations? Because men don’t just die violently in a spontaneous manner like that.

      7) To claim that the “opposition” as a whole committed massacres is disingenuous in the extreme. There are literally hundreds of opposition groups, it’s hardly homogeneous. To claim that “the opposition” as a whole committed a massacre is to accuse every opposition group of war crimes, which is simply untrue. The PYD has fought against, and consistently opposed, the FSA & allies since 2012. Hence why people have called them shabihat al-Akrad.

      8) I imagine the regime (government?) was involved in the assassination. But the fact remains that the PYD freely allowed mukhabarat agents to walk around in the Kurdish areas – agents that commit killings like these. They even allowed branches of the dreaded intelligence agencies to remain open in the areas they controlled, within several steps of many of their bases. You could literally see Assad’s portrait from the window of many PYD buildings.

      9) You can look up Dr. Resid, you will find a lot of sources on Google about his death.

      10) This is the most disingenuous comment yet. Because some opposition fighters wrongfully used chemical weapons in Sheikh Maqsoud, this means that Syrians poured chemical gas onto their own families in Ghouta, and their own fighters, purely to instigate western intervention? Not only is this hypothesis ridiculous to anyone who knows how important the family is in Syrian society (and Muslim fighters would never commit mass murder against Muslims like that) but also in the military sense. Ghouta is surrounded and the situation there, militarily, is grave. They need all the men and resources they can get. So why would they gas themselves and cause further ruin.

      11) I think my “epic” story adds up very well when you take everything into account. Do you have any sources on Yeni Safak supposedly being unreliable? I’d genuinely like to read them if so.


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